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Determining the Materiality of Earnings Forecasts 
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act  
in Helwig v. Vencor 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress included safe harbor provisions for forward-looking 
statements in the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA” or “Reform Act”)1 to “enhance market efficiency by en-
couraging companies to disclose forward-looking information.”2 The 
second of these safe harbors provides that a defendant “shall not be 
liable with respect to any forward-looking statement, whether writ-
ten or oral, if . . . the forward-looking statement is . . . immaterial.”3 
Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, lower courts applied a variety 
of materiality standards to forward-looking statements. Many courts 
applied the standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson4 (a case involving non-predictive statements), under which a 
statement’s materiality turns on whether “‘there is a substantial like-
 
 1. Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77z-1, 77z-2, 78a, 
78j-1, 78t, 78u, 78u-4, 78u-5 (Supp. I 1995). The safe harbor provisions are codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-5 (Section 27A of the Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Section 21E 
of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)). The Reform Act defines “forward-looking 
statement” as: 
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income 
loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, 
capital structure, or other financial items; (B) a statement of the plans and objectives 
of management for future operations, including plans or objectives relating to the 
products or services of the issuer; (C) a statement of future economic performance, 
including any such statement contained in a discussion and analysis of financial con-
dition by the management or in the results of operations included pursuant to the 
rules and regulations of the Commission; (D) any statement of the assumptions un-
derlying or relating to any statement described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C); (E) 
any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the extent that the 
report assesses a forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or (F) a statement 
containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may be specified by rule 
or regulation of the Commission. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1) (Supp. I 1995). 
 2. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 741. 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (Supp. I 1995). 
 4. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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lihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important.’”5 
Other courts found the direct application of the Basic test inappro-
priate in the forward-looking statement context and, therefore, ap-
plied various proxy “bright-line” materiality tests instead. 
Because the PSLRA does not express an explicit preference for 
the standard endorsed in Basic or for any of the bright-line material-
ity tests, post-PSLRA courts must decide which standard is most 
consistent with the overall legislative scheme of the Act to determine 
whether the second safe harbor immunizes a given forward-looking 
statement from liability. This Note argues that the use of bright-line 
materiality tests rather than the standard endorsed in Basic was un-
justified before the enactment of the PSLRA and remains unjustified 
after the Act’s passage. This Note, therefore, concludes that post-
PSLRA courts should not use these bright-line tests to give content 
to the second PSLRA safe harbor. 
Part II of this Note briefly describes the Securities Exchange 
Commission’s (“SEC” or “Commission”) regulatory approach to 
forward-looking statements prior to the PSLRA and then summa-
rizes the PSLRA safe harbor provisions. Part III discusses the dis-
agreement in Helwig v. Vencor Inc.,6 the principal case of this Note, 
between the Sixth Circuit en banc majority and dissent over the ap-
plicability of the PSLRA’s “immateriality” safe harbor to optimistic 
earnings forecasts made by the defendant that proved inaccurate. 
The majority cited the materiality standard endorsed in Basic, but 
then, in a puzzling turn, found that the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line 
“substantial certainty” test, if appropriately qualified, was consistent 
with that standard. Applying this qualified substantial certainty test 
to the defendants’ earnings forecasts, the majority found that the 
forecasts could not “be deemed ‘immaterial’ within the meaning of 
the PLSRA.”7 The dissent argued that Basic does not require courts 
to assess the materiality of forward-looking information by applying 
the materiality standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in that case. 
The dissent, therefore, applied the substantial certainty test without 
 
 5. Id. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 
(1976)). 
 6. 2001 Fed. App. 0179P (6th Cir.), 251 F.3d 540.  In order to avoid confusion, this 
decision will be referred to hereinafter in the footnotes as Helwig II.  The court’s earlier deci-
sion, Helwig v. Vencor, 2000 Fed. App. 0145P (6th Cir.), 210 F.3d 612, will be referred to as 
Helwig I.  Unless otherwise noted, all textual references to Helwig shall refer to Helwig II. 
 7. Helwig II, 2001 Fed. App. 0179P, ¶ 34, 251 F.3d at 556. 
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any qualification and found the forecasts immaterial as a matter of 
law. 
Part IV of this Note identifies several important aspects of the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of the issue of materiality and then, with 
the help of that background, analyzes the Helwig dissent’s use of the 
substantial certainty test. Part V describes some of the other bright-
line materiality tests that pre-PSLRA circuit and district courts have 
applied to find projections and other forward-looking information 
immaterial as a matter of law. The Fourth Circuit has often achieved 
this result by applying a “guarantee” test, under which a projection is 
material only if its presentation suggests to investors that the results 
it projects are guaranteed. The Fourth Circuit’s justification for ap-
plying this test, rather than the materiality test endorsed in Basic, is 
based on the assumption that accuracy-based protection8 is not avail-
able with respect to forward-looking statements because such state-
ments almost always prove wrong in hindsight.9 This justification is 
unconvincing, Part V argues, because the fact that a projection did 
not materialize does not mean that a court cannot still find it was 
“true when made” by assessing the accuracy of the projection’s im-
plied representations. Part VI provides a brief conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The threshold requirement for establishing liability under all of 
the federal securities fraud rules is a showing that the defendant 
made a materially false or misleading statement.10 In other words, a 
court’s assessment of the falsity and materiality of the defendant’s 
 
 8. In a case involving an allegedly fraudulent statement of historical fact, a defendant 
can prevail simply by demonstrating that the historical events or performance that the state-
ment reported did in fact occur. 
 9. In the Fourth Circuit’s view, the added protection of the guarantee materiality test 
compensates for this loss of accuracy-based protection. 
 10. A statement about an issuer that is technically true may nevertheless cause an outside 
observer to come to an incorrect conclusion if the speaker fails to make certain additional dis-
closures germane to the statement. The language used in Rule 10b-5 (the antifraud rule relied 
on by the plaintiffs in the principal case of this Note) to ensure that such technically true but 
misleading statements are deemed false is very similar to that used in sections 11 and 12(a)-2: 
“It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b), 10b-5(b) (2001); 
cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (Supp. I 1995). See generally Donald C. 
Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 87 (1999). 
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statements determines the actionability per se of the statements. If a 
court determines that the defendant’s statements were both false and 
material, it will then apply the other elements of the antifraud rule 
relied upon by the plaintiff to determine whether the circumstances 
under which the actionable statements were made entitle the plaintiff 
to recovery.11 
For the first several decades following the passage of the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act, the SEC prohibited the inclusion of 
financial projections and other forward-looking information in 
documents filed with the Commission.12 Consequently, only a small 
number of private securities fraud cases during this period were 
based on allegedly fraudulent forward-looking statements. The SEC 
formally reversed its policy on forward-looking statements in 1978 
and shortly thereafter adopted a general safe harbor rule to encour-
age their disclosure in filed documents.13 Since that time, however,  
 
 
 11. The plaintiffs in Helwig sought to recover under Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the 
SEC under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. To prevail on a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud 
claim, a plaintiff must prove that, in connection with purchase or sale of a security, (1) the de-
fendant made false statement or omission (2) of material fact (3) with scienter (4) upon which 
the plaintiff justifiably relied (5) that caused the plaintiff’s damages. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2001); Twiss v. Kury, 25 F.3d 1551, 1558 (11th Cir. 1994). While the first two elements of 
the rule, falsity and materiality, concern the nature of the disclosure itself (its actionability per 
se), the third, fourth, and fifth elements concern, respectively, the state of mind of the party 
that made the disclosure, the response of the plaintiff to the disclosure and the impact of that 
response on the plaintiff. The primary distinction between Rule 10b-5 and the antifraud rules 
of the Securities Act, most importantly sections 11 and 12(a)(2), is that a showing of scienter is 
not a prerequisite to recovery under the latter. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(2) (Supp. I 1995). 
Under section 11, for instance, an issuer is strictly liable for material misstatements or omis-
sions in a registration statement and other participants in the offering may be jointly liable to 
the extent they failed undertake a reasonable investigation of the truthfulness of the misstate-
ments. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (Supp. I 1995). 
 12. See Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts’ Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Pro-
jections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. 
L. REV. 1114, 1117 (1989). The SEC’s policy was based on the view that investors would 
place undue faith in projections included in documents reviewed by the Commission. Id. at 
1117–19. 
 13. See id. at 1122–23; see also 12 C.F.R. § 563d.3b-6 (2001). The Commission con-
currently adopted Rule 175 under the Securities Act. The text of Rule 175 is identical to Rule 
3b-6 except for the respective references to the “Securities Exchange Act of 1934” and the 
“Securities Act of 1933.” Consistent with courts’ interpretations of Rule 10b-5 and the other 
federal antifraud rules, Rule 3b-6 includes in the definition of “fraudulent statement” any 
statement “which is an untrue statement of a material fact, a statement false or misleading with 
respect to any material fact, [or] an omission to state a material fact necessary to make a state-
ment not misleading.” 12 C.F.R. § 563d.3b-6(d) (2001). 
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courts have been criticized for inconsistently applying the safe har-
bor.14 
In late 1994, noting that, “[c]ontrary to the Commission’s origi-
nal intent, the safe harbor is currently invoked on a very limited basis 
in a litigation context,”15 the SEC solicited public comment on 
whether the safe harbor was “effective in encouraging disclosure of 
voluntary forward-looking information and protecting investors or, if 
not, [whether it] should be revised.”16 Shortly thereafter, however, 
the Commission’s rulemaking proceedings were effectively pre-
empted by the introduction of a bill in Congress that contained a 
wide variety of provisions aimed at reforming federal securities litiga-
tion, including a new safe harbor for forward-looking statements.17 
When the legislation was finally enacted at the end of 1995 as the 
PSLRA, it contained three independent forward-looking statement 
safe harbors.18 
The first safe harbor immunizes a forward-looking statement that 
is identified as such and “is accompanied by meaningful cautionary 
statements identifying important factors that could cause actual re-
sults to differ materially from those in the forward-looking state-
ment.”19 While there is wide agreement that this safe harbor is based 
upon the judicially developed “bespeaks caution” doctrine, the deci-
sions that address the question of what constitutes a “meaningful” 
cautionary statement are inconsistent.20 The second safe harbor, the 
meaning of which was debated by the Helwig majority and dissent, 
immunizes a forward-looking statement that is “immaterial.”21 The 
third safe harbor shields defendants from liability if the plaintiff fails  
 
 
 14. See Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No. 
33,7101, 57 SEC Docket 1999, 1994 WL 562021, at *9 (Oct. 13, 1994). 
 15. Id. at *1. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (Supp. I 1995) (section 27A of the Exchange Act and section 
21E of the Securities Act). Although section 27A speaks in terms of a single safe harbor, be-
cause of the disjunctive nature of subsection (c)(1) a defendant can obtain the protection of 
the section by meeting any of the three independent tests. See infra text accompanying notes 
19–22. 
 19. Id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. I 1995). 
 20. See Ann Morales Olazabal, Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements Under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: What’s Safe and What’s Not?, 105 DICK. L. 
REV. 1, Fall 2000, at 14. 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. I 1995). 
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to prove that the speaker who made the forward-looking statement 
had “actual knowledge” that the statement was false or misleading.22 
III. HELWIG V. VENCOR 
This Part discusses the disagreement between the Helwig major-
ity and dissent over the applicability of the PSLRA “immateriality” 
safe harbor. It first provides a summary of the facts and procedural 
history of the case and then discusses the contrasting responses of 
the majority and dissent to the Sixth Circuit “substantial certainty” 
materiality doctrine.23 
 
 22. Id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (Supp. I 1995). Along with the safe harbor provisions, the 
PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards were among the most controversial provisions of the 
Reform Act. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: 
Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 977 (1996). The falsity pleading 
standard, set forth under section 21D(b)(1) of the Exchange Act, requires that “the complaint 
shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the 
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on 
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief 
is formed.” 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (Supp. I 1995). The scienter pleading standard, set 
forth under section 21D(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, requires that where a “required state of 
mind” is an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action, the complaint “shall . . . state with par-
ticularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state 
of mind.” 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. I 1995). At the pleading stage of a litigation based 
on allegedly fraudulent forward-looking statements, the safe harbor provisions interact with 
these pleading standards. For instance, the actual knowledge requirement of the third safe har-
bor supplies the “required state of mind” to which the PSLRA scienter pleading standard ap-
plies. Likewise, where a plaintiff asserts that cautionary statements accompanying a projection 
were not meaningful because, for instance, an internal company report describes factors that 
were not contained in the cautionary statements accompanying the projection, but which were 
much more likely to affect actual results than those factors that were contained in such state-
ments, the complaint may be dismissed under the falsity pleading standard unless it identifies 
such things as “the sources of [the plaintiff’s] information with respect to the reports, how [the 
plaintiff] learned of the reports, who drafted them, or which officers received them.” In re Sili-
con Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 1999). For commentary on the Re-
form Act’s pleading standards, see Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Share-
holder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773 (2000); Ann Morales Olazabal, The 
Search for “Middle Ground”: Towards a Harmonized Interpretation of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act’s New Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN., Spring 2001, at 
153; Elliott J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural Catch-
22 That the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q., Summer 
1998, at 457; Elliot J. Weiss, Pleading Securities Fraud, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring/Summer 2001, at 5. 
 23. See Hiler, supra note 12, at 1180–81. 
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A. Facts and Procedural History 
In 1997, Vencor, Inc. was one of the largest full-service provid-
ers of long-term health care in the United States.24 In February of 
that year, the company publicly announced several earnings forecasts, 
including estimated fourth-quarter earnings of $0.59 to $0.64 per 
share.25 The same month, President Clinton proposed legislation 
aimed at balancing the federal budget.26 The proposed legislation 
contained several provisions for adjusting the manner and extent of 
Medicare and Medicaid payouts to health care providers such as 
Vencor.27 Vencor directed the preparation of several cost analyses of 
the budget reform proposals and, in July, circulated an internal 
memorandum regarding the potential impact of the legislation on 
the company’s finances.28 
At the end of July, Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act,29 
which contained two of the four health care reform provisions that 
were included in President Clinton’s February proposal.30 The Presi-
dent signed the legislation shortly thereafter. In late September, 
Vencor reaffirmed its February earnings forecasts for the fourth quar-
ter without disclosing the results of its internal analyses of the budget 
reform proposals. In addition, in each of its three periodic reports 
filed with the SEC from February to September, Vencor stated that 
it could not “predict the content of any healthcare or budget reform 
legislation”31 and that it was thus “unable to assess the effect of any 
such legislation on its business.”32 On October 22, however, Vencor 
announced that its fourth quarter earnings would fall far short of its 
forecasts because of the impact of the Balanced Budget Act on its 
operations.33 In response to the announcement, its stock price fell 
nearly thirty percent.34 
 
 24. See Helwig II, 2001 Fed. App. 0179P, ¶ 1 (6th Cir.), 251 F.3d at 545. 
 25. Id. ¶ 4, 251 F.3d at 545. 
 26. Id. ¶ 2, 251 F.3d at 545. 
 27. Id. ¶ 3, 251 F.3d at 545. 
 28. Helwig I, 2000 Fed. App. 0145P, ¶ 4 (6th Cir.), 210 F.3d at 616 n.7. 
 29. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). 
 30. Helwig II, 2001 Fed. App. 0179P, ¶ 3, 251 F.3d at 546. 
 31. Id. ¶ 4, 251 F.3d at 546. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. ¶ 5, 251 F.3d at 546. 
 34. Id. Vencor’s stock price fell from $42-5/8 per share to $30 per share after the an-
nouncement. Id. 
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The plaintiffs, seeking recovery on behalf of a class of investors 
that bought shares of Vencor between February and October, 
brought suit in December alleging, among other things, that the 
earnings forecasts were materially misleading in violation of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.35 Considering Vencor’s motion to dismiss, 
the district court found that the plaintiffs had stated a claim under 
the PSLRA, but then, without notice to either party, converted Ven-
cor’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, which 
it then granted.36 On appeal, a majority of a three-member panel of 
the Sixth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that the motion conver-
sion was improper, but nevertheless affirmed the district court’s dis-
missal after finding that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not the meet the 
PSLRA pleading standards.37 The plaintiffs responded by filing a pe-
tition for a rehearing en banc, which the court granted.38 
Finding that the district court’s motion conversion was a “seri-
ous error”39 and that the plaintiffs’ complaint stated a claim, the en 
banc court reversed the district court’s dismissal.40 Judge Merritt, 
writing for the seven-member en banc majority, framed his opinion 
in terms of whether, under the allegations in the plaintiffs’ com-
plaint, Vencor could claim any of the PSLRA safe harbors for its 
earnings forecasts and other forward-looking statements.41 After de-
termining that none of the safe harbors were available for any of 
Vencor’s forward-looking statements, the majority found it relatively 
easy to conclude that the plaintiffs had met the pleading standards of 
 
 35. Helwig I, 2000 Fed. App. 0145P, ¶ 11, 210 F.3d 612, 618. The defendants in-
cluded, in addition to the company, six of the company’s directors. Id. ¶ 3, 210 F.3d at 615. 
 36. Helwig II, 2001 Fed. App. 0179P, ¶¶ 25–26, 251 F.3d at 552–53. 
 37. Helwig I, 2000 Fed. App. 0145P, ¶ 16, 210 F.3d at 619. A plaintiff’s Rule 10b-5 
claim may be dismissed under the PSLRA if the court finds that allegations in the complaint 
fail to provide sufficient corroborating details to meet the particularity requirements of the 
PLSRA pleading standards. In this case, the two-member panel majority did not question the 
sufficiency of detail in the plaintiffs’ complaint, but rather found that the alleged facts did not 
“establish either (1) the falsity or the misleading characteristics of the defendants’ statements 
or, (2) a strong inference that the defendants had the state of mind required by the statute.” 
Id. ¶ 17, 210 F.3d at 620. In other words, while sufficiently particularized, the plaintiffs’ alle-
gations, in the majority’s view, failed to satisfy the substantive requirements of the PSLRA 
pleading standards. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (Supp. I 1995). 
 38. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 222 F.3d 268 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 39. Helwig II, 2001 Fed. App. 0179P, ¶ 25, 251 F.3d at 552. 
 40. Id. ¶ 1, 251 F.3d at 544. 
 41. Id. ¶¶ 30–31, 251 F.3d at 554–55. 
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the PSLRA.42 In dissent, Judge Kennedy, joined by five other judges, 
argued that the earnings projections and other forward-looking 
statements were immaterial as a matter of law and were, therefore, 
protected under the second PSLRA safe harbor.43 
Under the materiality test endorsed by the Supreme Court in Ba-
sic Inc. v. Levinson, a false or misleading statement is actionable un-
der Rule 10b-5 if “‘there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important.’”44 The thirty-percent drop 
in Vencor’s stock price in response to the company’s announcement 
that actual earnings would fall short of its forecasts strongly suggests 
that reasonable investors considered the forecasts important. The fol-
lowing section examines how, notwithstanding the seemingly obvi-
ous significance of the forecasts to investors, the Helwig majority and 
dissent were able to reach different conclusions as to the forecasts’ 
materiality.45 
B. The Conflicting Approaches of the Helwig Majority and Dissent in 
Determining the Availability of the PSLRA  
Immateriality Safe Harbor 
The Helwig majority ultimately concluded that, although Basic 
involved nonpredictive statements, it was appropriate to apply the 
materiality standard endorsed in that case to Vencor’s earnings fore-
casts.46 It began its analysis, however, by acknowledging the Sixth 
Circuit doctrine that “sales figures, forecasts and the like only rise to 
the level of materiality when they can be calculated with substantial 
 
 42. Id. ¶ 53, 251 F.3d at 562. 
 43. Id. ¶¶ 69–80, 251 F.3d at 567–70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Judge Kennedy also 
argued, as she did in the panel majority opinion, that the allegations in the complaint failed to 
meet the “strong inference” requirement of the scienter pleading standard. Id. ¶¶ 84–86, 251 
F.3d at 571 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See supra note 22 for a discussion of the PSLRA plead-
ing standards. 
 44. 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 
438, 449 (1976)). 
 45. This Note does not discuss the disagreement between the majority and the dissent 
over the availability of the immateriality safe harbor for the statements that Vencor made re-
garding the Balanced Budget Act in its annual and quarterly reports prior to the signing of the 
Act. The majority found that these statements were forward looking for purposes of the 
PSLRA and that they were material. The dissent, applying the “substantial certainty” material-
ity test discussed below, found that these statements were immaterial. This Note also does not 
directly address the disagreement between the majority and the dissent over whether the com-
plaint met the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA. 
 46. Helwig II, 2001 Fed. App. 0179P, ¶ 34, 251 F.3d at 556. 
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certainty.”47 Rather than reject this substantial certainty test outright 
(as inconsistent with the materiality standard endorsed in Basic), the 
majority instead opted to qualify the test by adopting the view that 
“matters that are not material because they are not so probable or 
relevant . . . may be material if information about them is stated 
falsely or misleadingly in [other] communications.”48 Applying this 
qualified “substantial certainty” test to the facts of the case, the ma-
jority found that while Vencor’s earnings forecasts may not have 
been material in isolation (because of their uncertainty) they became 
material, under the standard endorsed in Basic, when Vencor falsely 
stated “information about them”; that is, that it could not assess the 
impact of the Balanced Budget Act upon future earnings. In other 
words, Vencor’s knowledge that the Balanced Budget Act would ad-
versely affect its earnings, combined with its public insistence that it 
could not determine whether the Act would have any such effect, in 
the majority’s view, made its earnings forecasts material.49 
In response, Judge Kennedy claimed, “[T]he majority’s reading 
of our case law is not supported by the opinions they rely on, but in-
stead, it establishes a new principle which contradicts prior cases in 
this Circuit.”50 Among other flaws in the majority’s approach, Judge 
Kennedy pointed out that the majority “nimbly turns the question 
from whether estimates were capable of being calculated with sub-
stantial certainty to whether there was a substantial certainty that the 
 
 47. Id. ¶ 32, 251 F.3d at 555 (quoting James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 
(6th Cir. 1978)). 
 48. Id. (quoting Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 57 VA. L. REV. 723, 750 (1989)). 
 49. Id. ¶ 34, 251 F.3d at 556. Although the dissent did not criticize the majority’s 
opinion on this basis, the majority’s reliance on the falsity of the statements regarding the Bal-
anced Budget Act in its application of the materiality standard endorsed in Basic seems prob-
lematic. This approach is indistinguishable from an earlier approach used by the Sixth Circuit 
to assess the materiality of merger discussions that the Supreme Court rejected in that very 
case. Basic came up from the Sixth Circuit, which had concluded that even if the merger dis-
cussions at issue were not material initially, they became material when Basic denied they were 
occurring: “‘[O]nce a statement is made denying the existence of any [merger] discussions, 
even discussions that might not have been material in absence of the denial are material be-
cause they make the statement made untrue.’” Basic, 485 U.S. at 229 (quoting Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 786 F.2d 741, 749 (6th Cir. 1986)). Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, 
rejected this approach, noting that it “fails to recognize that, in order to prevail on a Rule 10b-
5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the statements were misleading as to a material fact. It is 
not enough that a statement is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is otherwise in-
significant.” Id. at 238. 
 50. Helwig II, 2001 Fed. App. 0179P, ¶ 71, 251 F.3d at 567 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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[Balanced Budget] Act, if enacted, would have any adverse effect on 
Vencor’s business.”51 In Judge Kennedy’s view, this reorientation of 
the substantial certainty test was “disingenuous” because, under a 
faithful reading of Sixth Circuit precedent, a court is required to find 
company projections that are incapable of being calculated with sub-
stantial certainty immaterial as a matter of law regardless of whether 
the company disclosed additional information germane to those pro-
jections.52 Applying this test to Vencor’s earnings forecasts, Judge 
Kennedy found the forecasts clearly immaterial because the plaintiffs 
had made no allegations suggesting the forecasts could be calculated 
with substantial certainty.53 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF THE MATERIALITY 
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
This Part reviews important aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.54 and Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson55 with respect to the issue of materiality. It then explains 
how the Helwig dissent was able to distinguish the holdings of these 
cases to justify its use of the substantial certainty test to find Vencor’s 
earnings forecasts immaterial as a matter of law. 
 A. The Pre-PSLRA Materiality Teachings of the Supreme Court 
 1. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 
In TSC Industries, National Industries, Inc. (“National”) ac-
quired thirty-four percent of TSC Industries’ (“TSC”) outstanding 
stock from TSC insiders.56 Shortly thereafter, the boards of the two 
companies, soliciting the stockholders’ approval of a transaction 
whereby TSC would become a wholly owned subsidiary of National, 
 
 51. Id. ¶ 65, 251 F.3d at 568 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Judge Kennedy added that Congress’ consideration of 
the Balanced Budget Act, on which the majority based its conclusion that the earnings esti-
mates were material, if anything, made the estimates less material because it could only have 
made them less capable of being calculated with substantial certainty. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). 
 54. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 55. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 56. TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 440. 
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distributed joint proxy statements to the stockholders of their respec-
tive companies.57 The plaintiff, a major TSC shareholder, brought an 
action against both companies alleging that the joint proxy statement 
was materially misleading in violation of section 14(a) and Rule 14a-
9 because it failed to disclose the extent of National’s control over 
TSC at the time the transaction was approved by the TSC board.58 
The Court of Appeals held the omission was material as a matter 
of law because “‘a reasonable shareholder might consider [the omis-
sion] important.’”59 Finding this standard “unnecessarily low,”60 the 
Supreme Court stated: “The general standard of materiality that we 
think best comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as follows: An 
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a rea-
sonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote.”61 The Supreme Court emphasized that its formulation of this 
standard was guided by “[a] recognition . . . of the Rule’s broad re-
medial purpose.”62 This emphasis on the purpose of Rule 14a-9 sug-
gests that the Court intended the standard to be applicable only in 
the Rule 14a-9 context. 63 Nevertheless, nearly every court that has 
been required to make a materiality determination under any of the 
federal antifraud provisions in a post-TSC Industries case has com-
menced its inquiry by repeating the TSC Industries standard.64 
 
 
 57. Id. at 441. 
 58. Id. at 442–43. 
 59. Id. at 445 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330 (7th 
Cir. 1975)). 
 60. Id. at 448. 
 61. Id. at 449. The Court then clarified what constitutes “important” in this context: 
It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the stan-
dard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the cir-
cumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the delibera-
tions of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information 
made available. 
Id. 
 62. TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 448. 
 63. The formulation of the standard itself, focusing as it does on whether “a reasonable 
shareholder would consider [the information] important in deciding how to vote,” also sup-
ports this conclusion regarding the Court’s intent. Id. at 449 (emphasis added). 
 64. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 41 
(3d ed. 2001). 
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Although the TSC Industries Court reversed the lower court’s 
holding that the alleged omissions were material as a matter of law, it 
did not apply the materiality standard it announced to find the al-
leged omissions immaterial as a matter of law. Instead, observing 
that it is normally improper to decide the issue of materiality as a 
matter of law, the Court remanded for further proceedings: 
In considering whether summary judgment on the issue [of materi-
ality] is appropriate, we must bear in mind that the underlying ob-
jective facts, which will often be free from dispute, are merely the 
starting point for the ultimate determination of materiality. The de-
termination requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 
“reasonable shareholder” would draw from a given set of facts and 
the significance of those inferences to him, and these assessments 
are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact. Only if the established omis-
sions are “so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable 
minds cannot differ on the question of materiality” is the ultimate 
issue of materiality appropriately resolved “as a matter of law” by 
summary judgment.65 
Although this language does not suggest that the Court viewed 
this part of its holding as being applicable only in the Rule 14a-9 
context, in the years that followed the Court’s decision, lower courts 
often found ways to declare statements that allegedly violated Rule 
10b-5 immaterial as a matter of law.66 The Third Circuit, for in-
stance, developed an agreement-in-principle test that empowered 
judges to find preliminary merger discussions immaterial as a matter 
of law without making any direct inquiry into their significance to an 
investor.67 The subsequent adoption by several other circuit courts of 
the agreement-in-principle test led the Supreme Court, eight years 
after its decision in TSC Industries, to grant certiorari in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson.68 
2. Basic Inc. v. Levinson 
In Basic, the plaintiffs asserted that Basic Inc. violated Rule 10b-
 
 65. TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 450 (quoting Johns Hopkins U. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 
1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970)). 
 66. The lower courts’ failure to follow the guidance of the Court on this issue is surpris-
ing given their expansive use of the TSC Industries materiality formulation, which, as noted 
above, was apparently not intended to be applied outside the Rule 14a-9 context. 
 67. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 68. 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1998). 
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5 when the company falsely denied that it was involved in merger 
negotiations.69 The negotiations extended over three months and 
culminated in Basic’s public endorsement of the acquiror’s tender of-
fer for all of the company’s shares.70 The denials included three sepa-
rate public statements, the last of which was made in a report to Ba-
sic’s shareholders issued about one month before the company 
endorsed the tender offer.71 
Although neither party disputed the “application of the [TSC 
Industries] § 14(a) definition of materiality to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5,”72 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, found it worthwhile 
to state: “We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries standard of 
materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.”73 He then ac-
knowledged, however, that, in cases involving information about 
contingent or speculative events, the “reasonable investor” inquiry 
required by a direct application of the TSC Industries materiality 
standard may lead to unpredictable results because “it is difficult to 
ascertain whether the ‘reasonable investor’ would have considered 
[such] information significant at the time.”74 
To resolve the difficulty inherent in judging the importance of 
speculative events, Basic urged the Court to apply the Third Circuit’s 
 
 69. Id. at 226–28. 
 70. Id. at 227–28. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 232 n.8. 
 73. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232. 
 74. Id. By holding that the TSC Industries standard should nevertheless be directly ap-
plied to statements containing contingent or speculative information such as a statement re-
garding the status of preliminary merger negotiations, the Court, in addition to extending the 
application of the TSC Industries standard to the Rule 10b-5 context, also extended the appli-
cation of the standard to a new type of information. In TSC Industries, the statements the 
plaintiffs alleged were misleading concerned the extent of TSC’s present control over National. 
Information concerning current or historical facts is often called hard information and is dis-
tinguishable from the speculative or soft information at issue in Basic. The significance of 
merger negotiations to a reasonable investor, as the Court points out, is a function of the 
probability that the negotiations will culminate in an agreement and the magnitude of the 
deal’s impact on the company if they do. Id. at 238. Thus, while Basic’s statements concerned 
a current state of affairs (the existence/status of merger negotiations), the significance of the 
statements was only ascertainable by reference to future events. These were not, however, for-
ward-looking statements. This is not to say, of course, that statements regarding merger nego-
tiations cannot be forward looking. Had Basic, for instance, rather than denying that the com-
pany was presently involved merger negotiations, instead stated that the company believed a 
merger would be consummated on favorable terms, its statement would have been forward 
looking. 
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agreement-in-principle test.75 Under that test, preliminary merger 
negotiations do not become material until the parties reach agree-
ment on the price and structure of the deal.76 Although it acknowl-
edged that the agreement-in-principle test would provide manage-
ment with “a usable, bright-line rule”77 for determining when a 
statement is material, the Court rejected the test because such a justi-
fication does not even “purport[] to explain why drawing the line at 
agreement-in-principle reflects the significance of the information 
upon the investor’s decision.”78 In other words, the Court found the 
agreement-in-principle test’s inquiry into the status of the merger 
discussions to decide the materiality question inappropriate because 
nothing about that inquiry suggests that its results are likely to corre-
late with the results of the “reasonable investor” inquiry required by 
a direct application of the TSC Industries standard. 
The Court also observed that any other approach to assessing 
materiality that eliminates, as the agreement-in-principle test does, 
the need for “delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable 
shareholder’ would draw from a given set of facts and the signifi-
cance of those inferences to him”79 will suffer from the same defect: 
“Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always 
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as material-
ity, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.”80 It seems 
that in practice such approaches to materiality will tend to be under-
inclusive far more often than overinclusive.81 In other words, they 
will empower judges to find misrepresentations immaterial as a mat- 
 
 
 75. Id. at 232–33. 
 76. Id. at 233. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 234. Instead of the “agreement-in-principle” test, the court adopted the 
highly fact-dependent probability/magnitude test, which, rather than shifting the focus of in-
quiry to the significance a reasonable investor would attach to the negotiations, simply assists 
the fact-finder in evaluating the level of such significance. Id. at 238; see supra note 74. 
 79. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). 
 80. Basic, 485 U.S. at 236 (1988). 
 81. There are likely to be very few cases, for instance, in which a court would find deni-
als of merger negotiations material under the agreement-in-principle test, but immaterial under 
a direct application of the TSC Industries standard. It is true that even though investors in a 
large company would not likely consider acquisitions of much smaller companies significant at 
any stage, such acquisitions would nevertheless be deemed material under the agreement-in-
principle test once their terms were settled. It seems that such small acquisitions, however, 
would very rarely, if ever, create incentives for managers to cover up the negotiations. 
3BEC.DOC 3/23/02  11:30 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
126 
ter of law more often than they will empower them to find misrepre-
sentations material as a matter of law. 
B. The Precedential Value of TSC Industries and Basic for Cases 
Involving Forward-Looking Statements 
The Basic holding with respect to materiality can be restated in 
two parts: (1) The definition of materiality developed in TSC Indus-
tries for the purpose of Rule 14a-9 is also the proper materiality defi-
nition for the Rule 10b-5 context; and (2) it is incorrect, in assessing 
the materiality of a defendant’s statements, to use tests that redirect 
the focus of inquiry away from the significance a reasonable investor 
would attach to the statements in order to find those statements 
immaterial as a matter of law. The second part of the holding thus 
concerns the proper mode of application of the materiality standard 
established by the first part of the holding. 
The Supreme Court in Basic did not qualify the first part of its 
holding. Consequently, a lower court cannot escape use of the TSC 
Industries definition of materiality if the case before it involves a Rule 
10b-5 claim. Arguably, however, the Supreme Court did qualify the 
second part of its holding. In a footnote at the beginning of the 
Court’s discussion of the second part of its holding, the Court ob-
served, “We do not address here any other kinds of contingent or 
speculative information, such as earnings forecasts or projections.”82 
A lower court might, therefore, consider the second part of the Basic 
holding to be mandatory only in cases that involve either hard in-
formation (as in TSC Industries) or non-predictive soft information 
(as in Basic).83 
The Helwig dissent read Basic in precisely this manner. Although 
Judge Kennedy acknowledged, consistent with the first part of the 
Basic holding, that “whether information is material depends on 
whether it is determined that a reasonable investor would find the 
information important,”84 she resisted the second part of the Basic 
holding because the role her substantial certainty test plays in 
answering that question is indistinguishable from the role the agree- 
 82. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 n.9. 
 83. In other words, a lower court could conclude that while Basic abrogated circuit 
court materiality tests that empower judges to find non-predictive statements immaterial as a 
matter of law, it left intact circuit court materiality tests that do the same with respect to for-
ward-looking statements. 
 84. Helwig II, 2001 Fed. App. 0179P, ¶ 80 n.1, 251 F.3d at 570 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting). 
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swering that question is indistinguishable from the role the agree-
ment-in-principle test plays in assessing the materiality of preliminary 
merger negotiations.85 Just as the agreement-in-principle test redi-
rects the focus of inquiry to the status of the merger discussions 
(away from the significance a reasonable investor would attach to the 
discussions), Judge Kennedy’s test redirects that focus to whether 
the projections “were capable of being calculated with substantial 
certainty.”86 Moreover, like the agreement-in-principle test, the sub-
stantial certainty test does not explain why the certainty of the fore-
casts “reflects [their] significance . . . upon the investor’s deci-
sion[s].”87 Thus, like the agreement-in-principle test, the substantial 
certainty test is “necessarily . . . underinclusive.”88 The difference be-
tween the two tests, of course, is in the type of statements to which 
each may be applied. Judge Kennedy did not explain why this differ-
ence should matter for the purpose of Rule 10b-5, but simply af-
firmed that under Sixth Circuit precedent it does: “This Circuit has 
continued to use the standard I rely on today well after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Basic.”89 
 V. IS THERE ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR APPLYING A  
NON-TSC INDUSTRIES MATERIALITY TEST  
TO FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS? 
The substantial certainty test, it turns out, is only one of several 
materiality tests that lower courts, in post-Basic decisions, have used 
to find forward-looking statements immaterial as a matter of law 
 
 85. Consequently, Judge Kennedy contends that Sixth Circuit precedent requires the 
court to “make [the materiality] determination in the context of projections by ascertaining 
whether the projections are able to be calculated with substantial certainty,” rather than by 
directly applying the TSC Industries test. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. ¶ 75, 251 F.3d at 568 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 87. Basic, 485 U.S. at 234 (emphasis added). An investor will, of course, consider the 
relative certainty of a forecast in assessing its significance. An inquiry into the relative certainty 
of a projection is, therefore, consistent with the second part of the Basic holding, assuming 
that information regarding such certainty was available to investors. Judge Kennedy’s material-
ity approach, however, mandates much more than simply taking the relative certainty of a 
projection into account. Under her approach, projections are immaterial as a matter of law not 
only if they are so uncertain that a reasonable investor, knowing of that uncertainty, would 
consider them insignificant, but also if, while not subject to such extreme uncertainty, they 
simply cannot be calculated with substantial certainty. 
 88. Id. at 236. 
 89. Helwig II, 2001 Fed. App. 0179P, ¶ 80 n.1, 251 F.3d at 570 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting). 
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without directly inquiring into the significance a reasonable investor 
would attach to the statements. Several circuits have applied a “guar-
antee” test to achieve this result.90 Likewise, in what Professor Don-
ald C. Langevoort terms “strong uses” of the popular “bespeaks cau-
tion” doctrine, several lower courts have found issuer statements 
containing specific forecasts of future performance that are accompa-
nied by generic warnings immaterial as a matter of law.91 
 
 90. See, e.g., Lasker v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 85 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1996); Searls 
v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1995); Hillison Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 
204 (4th Cir. 1994); Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993); Krim v. Banc-
Texas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1993). The guarantee test, like the agreement-in-
principle test and the substantial certainty test, is a proxy for direct application of the TSC In-
dustries test. Like those tests, the guarantee test relieves the judge of the obligation of assessing 
what inferences a reasonable investor would draw from the disclosures or omissions and of the 
significance to him of those inferences. While the agreement-in-principle test shifts the focus of 
inquiry to the status of the negotiations and the substantial certainty test to the level of cer-
tainty with which the projection is capable of being calculated, the guarantee test shifts the 
focus of inquiry to the wording of the prediction. See infra Part V.A. Thus, like the agreement-
in-principle test and the substantial certainty test, the guarantee test designates one criterion as 
determinative and therefore is also necessarily underinclusive. 
 91. Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution”, 49 BUS. LAW, Feb. 
1994, at 481, 486. Professor Langevoort notes: 
the most striking feature of these [strong] uses is the mechanical nature of their ex-
ercise. Instead of looking closely and contextually at the disclosure in light of the 
cautions, . . . the cautionary language is given talismanic significance. Even a forecast 
that conveys carefully considered optimism gains protection. No doubt the relative 
simplicity of this approach is what entitles the courts to apply it is [sic] as a matter of 
law. 
Id. (citations omitted). Professor Langevoort contrasts such strong uses of the bespeaks cau-
tion doctrine with its more restrained use in Kaufman v. Trump’s Castle Funding, 7 F.3d 357 
(3d Cir. 1993), in which the court carefully considered the extent to which accompanying cau-
tionary statements were tailored to an allegedly fraudulent statement of optimism before find-
ing the statement immaterial as a matter of law. Langevoort, supra, at 486. The Kaufman 
court provided the following description of the “bespeaks caution” doctrine: 
[W]hen an offering document’s forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied 
by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will not form 
the basis for a securities fraud claim if those statements did not affect the “total mix” 
of information the document provided investors. In other words, cautionary lan-
guage, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as 
a matter of law. 
Kaufman, 7 F.3d at 371. Some commentators argue that Congress intended to codify this 
description of the doctrine by its adoption of the first PSLRA forward-looking statement safe 
harbor, which immunizes from liability any projection that is “accompanied by meaningful 
cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ ma-
terially from those in the [projection].” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. I 1995); see su-
pra notes 19, 20, and accompanying text. In the author’s view, the Kaufman court’s descrip-
tion should not control courts’ interpretation of this safe harbor for two reasons. First, the 
description does not contemplate that a projection will only be found immaterial as a matter of 
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Although Justice Kennedy did not explain why the second part 
of the Basic holding should not apply to forward-looking statements, 
it is clear that to the extent a justification for that view exists, it must 
be based on a distinction between these types of statements and the 
types of statements at issue in TSC Industries and Basic (statements 
containing hard facts or non-predictive soft information).92 The 
Fourth Circuit has offered such a justification. This Part examines 
that justification, which was advanced by the court in Raab v. Gen-
eral Physics Corp.93 in support of the guarantee test, and ultimately 
finds it unconvincing because of its failure to acknowledge the accu-
racy-based protection of the implied representation doctrine. 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Justification for Its Use of the  
Guarantee Materiality Standard 
In Raab, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s annual report 
contained a variety of materially misleading statements, including 
several forecasts that failed to materialize. Among those forecasts 
were predictions that “[r]egulatory changes . . . ha[d] created a mar-
ketplace for the [defendant’s] DOE Services Group with an expected 
annual growth rate of 10% to 30% over the next several years[,]” and 
“the DOE Services Group [was] poised to carry the growth and suc-
cess of 1991 well into the future.”94 After citing authority for the use 
of the “guarantee” test, the court found the predictions immaterial 
as a matter of law because they “hardly constitute[d] a guarantee.”95 
The court then explained how, in its view, the distinction between  
 
 
law if, as TSC Industries and Basic require, it is so obviously unimportant in the context of the 
cautionary statements that reasonable minds could not differ as to its materiality. See supra Part 
IV.A–B. Second, specific projections such as earnings forecasts are generally important to in-
vestors whether or not accompanied by relevant risk factors. It does not make sense, therefore, 
to say that accompanying risk factors make such projections immaterial. Such accompanying 
risk factors may, however, be relevant to the question of whether the projection was “true 
when made.” See infra Part V.B. 
 92. In other words, the justification cannot be wholly based on types of factors that the 
Supreme Court found did not justify the use of the agreement-in-principle test. For instance, 
the argument that a given materiality test for forward-looking statements would provide man-
agement with a “usable, bright-line rule” for determining when its predictions are material will 
not do. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 233. 
 93. 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 94. Id. at 288. 
 95. Id. at 290; see supra note 90. 
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statements of current fact and predictive statements justifies the use 
of this test: 
Notwithstanding our holding that the allegedly false predictions 
here are not material, we recognize that expressions of belief or 
opinion concerning current facts may be material. We do not be-
lieve, however, that this materiality extends so easily to opinions on 
uncertain future events. . . . Predictions of future growth stand on a 
different footing [than statements concerning current facts] be-
cause they will almost always prove to be wrong in hindsight. If a 
company predicts twenty-five percent growth, that is simply the 
company’s best guess as to how the future will play out. As a statis-
tical matter, twenty percent and thirty percent growth are both 
nearly as likely as twenty-five. If growth proves less than predicted, 
buyers will sue; if growth proves greater, sellers will sue. Imposing 
liability would put companies in a whipsaw, with a lawsuit almost a 
certainty. Such liability would deter companies from discussing 
their prospects, and the securities markets would be deprived of the 
information those predictions offer. We believe that this is contrary 
to the goal of full disclosure underlying the securities laws, and we 
decline to endorse it.96 
This justification for declining to apply the second part of the 
Basic holding to predictions deserves consideration because it does 
more than simply restate the arguments favoring a bright-line test 
that the Supreme Court rejected in Basic. While the Raab court did 
refer to the effect on management it believed a direct application of 
the TSC Industries materiality standard would have (i.e., disclosure 
deterrence), it argued that this outcome is the result of an important 
distinction between statements about current facts and forward-
looking statements. The latter, it argued, “stand on different foot-
ing . . . because they will almost always prove to be wrong in hind-
sight.”97 
The court’s conclusion that this difference justifies its use of a 
non-TSC Industries materiality standard is based on the Rule 10b-5 
requirement that a plaintiff prove the defendant’s statement was both 
false and material.98 This conjunctive test for actionability gives the 
defendant in any Rule 10b-5 case two separate grounds for prevail-
ing on a motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion. Accord-
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See supra notes 10, 11, and accompanying text. 
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ingly, when a company discloses information it knows will be consid-
ered significant by investors, it can still ensure that its statements will 
not be actionable by simply taking the time to verify their accuracy. 
This means of protection evaporates, however, where the disclosure 
contains projections, which “will almost always prove to be wrong in 
hindsight.”99 Consequently, unless the materiality bar is raised, com-
panies will only make projections that they either know investors will 
find insignificant or are certain will be realized and thus can guaran-
tee. The guarantee test removes this disclosure deterrent by making 
all projections except those that a company states as guarantees im-
material as a matter of law. In other words, the test’s heightened ma-
teriality standard compensates for the loss of accuracy-based protec-
tion and thereby restores the liability balance to a state that is 
conducive to “the goal of full disclosure underlying the securities 
laws.”100 
The Raab court’s justification of the guarantee test would also 
justify Judge Kennedy’s substantial certainty test. The important 
question, of course, is whether the underinclusiveness of such mate-
riality tests is a justifiable price101 to pay for avoiding the liability 
“whipsaw” that would otherwise deprive “the securities markets . . . 
of the information [companies’] predictions offer?”102 If there was 
simply no other way to address this excessive liability exposure, then 
the use of such tests may be justifiable. In other words, if a court’s 
only choices were to either raise the materiality bar or find the pre-
diction actionable because it proved to be wrong, then the court may 
be justified in applying a standard under which most types of con-
ventional forecasts will be deemed immaterial as a matter of law.103 
As it turns out, however, an alternative method for evaluating the 
falsity of projections, which has been applied by many lower courts 
since the SEC’s reversal of its policy on the disclosure of forward-
looking information, substantially dulls Raab’s “whipsaw.” 
 
 99. Raab, 4 F.3d at 290. 
 100. Id. 
 101. The definitional incoherence of these materiality tests, which do not even purport to 
“reflect[] the significance of the information upon [an] investor’s decision,” is an additional, 
albeit related, cost of their use. Basic, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988). 
 102. Raab, 4 F.3d at 290. 
 103. While there may be certain types of predictions that issuers can calculate with sub-
stantial certainty, revenue and earnings forecasts, which investors are perhaps most interested 
in, can rarely be calculated with substantial certainty. Likewise, issuers rarely use language in 
making revenue and earnings forecasts that suggest the predicted results are guaranteed. 
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B. The Implied Representation Doctrine 
The Ninth Circuit was the first court to apply explicitly this al-
ternative approach to analyzing the falsity of forward-looking state-
ments. In Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp.,104 a case that was decided 
three years before the SEC formally reversed its policy with respect 
to forward-looking information, the vice president of the Computer 
Sciences Corporation (CSC) stated in a speech to analysts that CSC 
expected to earn $1.00 per share for the current fiscal year, the end 
of which was a little over two months away.105 The plaintiff learned 
of the vice president’s remarks and purchased 2,000 shares of com-
pany stock at $30 per share.106 When CSC ultimately posted annual 
earnings of $0.41 per share, its stock price dropped to $10 per 
share.107 
The court first found that there could be “[no] doubt that the 
forecast of earnings was a ‘material’ fact”108 and then turned to the 
falsity inquiry: 
The next question is, was the forecast an “untrue” statement. Of 
course in hindsight it turned out to be wrong. But at least in the 
case of a prediction as to the future, that in itself does not make the 
statement untrue when made. However, the forecast may be re-
garded as [an implied] representation that [on the date it was 
made], CSC’s informed and reasonable belief was that . . . earnings 
would be approximately $1.00. . . . In addition, because [the dis-
closure of the forecast] implies a reasonable method of preparation 
and a valid basis, we believe also that it would be “untrue” absent 
such preparation or basis.109 
It is clear that an article by Homer Kripke, criticizing the SEC’s 
policy at that time of prohibiting the inclusion of projections in fil-
ings with the Commission, significantly influenced the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s analysis.110 In support of its implied representation doctrine, 
the court quoting Kripke, stated: 
 
 104. 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 105. Id. at 488. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Marx, 507 F.2d at 489. 
 109. Id. at 489–90. 
 110. See id. at 485, 490 n.7; Homer Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and 
Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151 (1970). 
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projections [should not] be subjected to statutory liabilities, either 
express or under rule 10b-5, in the same fashion as a statement of 
fact about last year’s sales or the ownership of a building. Rather 
the sole factual elements of a projection should be that it represents 
management’s view, that it was reached in a rational fashion and 
that it is a sincere view. Only these elements can be subject to a 
statutory liability, not the eventuation of the prophecy.111 
It is this concept of implicit factual elements, or implied repre-
sentations, that the Raab justification for not applying the second 
part of the Basic holding to forward-looking statements fails to ac-
knowledge. Under the implied representation doctrine, a company 
that decides to disclose projections it knows investors will consider 
significant can ensure that its statements will not be actionable even 
if it is not substantially certain that its actual performance will neither 
fall short of nor outdo those projections. While the speaker cannot 
verify beforehand the accuracy of the forecast, she can verify before-
hand the accuracy of whatever implicit factual elements the particular 
forecast contains and under the implied representation doctrine that 
is enough to make the forecast “true when made.” Because all for-
ward-looking statements contain implicit factual elements of some 
sort,112 it is incorrect for a court to assume, as the Raab court ap-
pears to have done, that it must either raise the materiality bar or 
find a projection actionable simply because it turned out to be 
wrong. 
C. Heightened Pleading Standards Allow Courts to Meaningfully 
Apply the Implied Representation Doctrine to Dismiss Abusive Suits 
The Rule 3b-6 safe harbor for forward-looking statements codi-
fies one version of the implied representation doctrine by providing 
that a forward-looking statement “shall be deemed not to be a 
fraudulent statement . . . , unless its is shown that such statement 
was made . . . without a reasonable basis or was disclosed in other 
than good faith.”113 Thus, if raised by a defendant, the Rule requires 
a court to evaluate the accuracy of the speaker’s implied representa-
 
 111. Marx, 507 F.2d at 490 n.7 (quoting Kripke, supra note 110, at 1199). 
 112. It seems unquestionable that every forward-looking statement, no matter how 
vaguely stated, at a minimum contains the implicit factual representation that the speaker does 
not, at the time, know of any information that makes that forecasted results impossible. 
 113. 12 C.F.R. § 563d.3b-6(a) (2001). See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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tions before concluding that the forward-looking statement was 
false. Critics of Rule 3b-6, however, have argued it is ineffective be-
cause its provisions “are not applied by the courts in a manner that 
results in quick and inexpensive dismissals of frivolous lawsuits.”114 
Such critics assert that “the safe harbor is infrequently raised by de-
fendants, perhaps because it compels judicial examination of reason-
ableness and good faith, which raise factual issues that often preclude 
early, prediscovery dismissal.”115 
At first glance, this assertion may seem to provide an alternative 
justification for the use of non-TSC Industries materiality tests. Even 
if the application of the implied representation doctrine means that 
legal liability will not necessarily follow where a projection fails to 
materialize, if a plaintiff can force an issuer to bear the costs of dis-
covery before a court will apply the doctrine, its protection is largely 
illusory. Hence, the failure of courts generally to find a way to apply 
the implied representation doctrine to dispose of cases at the plead-
ing stage would be a viable justification for a legislative upward ad-
justment in the materiality standard. That failure in a particular case 
(assuming the absence of such a legislative directive116), however, 
would not necessarily justify the judge’s application of an underinclu-
sive materiality test. If, for instance, the relevant procedural rules re-
quire any plaintiff alleging securities fraud to state, with a high de-
gree of particularity, facts that support an inference that the 
defendant’s statement was false and the judge fails to enforce this 
pleading requirement, this failure would not justify the judge’s sub-
sequent use of a “bright-line” materiality standard to correct his 
prior error. 
The pleading standard set forth in Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure arguably requires such a high degree of particular-
ity.117 Many courts that accepted this reading of the pleading rule in 
pre-PSLRA cases involving allegedly fraudulent forward-looking 
 
 114. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 14, at *8. 
 115. Id. at *9. 
 116. Nothing in the language of the PSLRA safe harbor or in the legislative history sug-
gests that Congress intended to endorse any of the non-TSC Industries materiality standards as 
an appropriate way of applying the immateriality prong of the safe harbor. While Congress did 
explicitly define a heightened scienter requirement under the third prong of the safe harbor, it 
did not define “immateriality.” 
 117. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) reads, “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.” Id. 
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statements thus felt obligated to vigorously apply some form of the 
implied representation doctrine at the pleading stage of the litiga-
tion. In many such cases, these courts dismissed complaints that did 
not plead with sufficient particularity facts that suggested the implicit 
representations contained in the forward-looking statement were 
false.118 In any event, any pre-PSLRA court that could not find in 
Rule 9(b) the obligation (or at least the flexibility) to require a plain-
tiff to plead the falsity element of his 10b-5 claim with a high degree 
of particularity cannot fail to see such an obligation in the pleading 
provisions of the PSLRA.119 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The bright-line materiality tests often applied by the lower courts 
in pre-PSLRA cases involving forward-looking statements are neces-
 
 118. See, e.g., San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris 
Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Finally, with respect to the company’s forward-
looking statements, plaintiffs have not alleged circumstances to show that the defendants 
lacked a reasonable basis for their optimistic, but qualified, predictions as to the company’s 
future performance.”); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F. 2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 
1991) (“[T]he plaintiffs did not offer any objective evidence that the [forward-looking] state-
ments were anything other than honestly held convictions based on the historical information 
which Lamson possessed.”); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 117–18 (2d Cir. 
1982) (“It is the ‘more’ that section 9(b) requires and that is lacking in plaintiff’s complaint. 
We now know that the increased activity forecast for the construction industry did not take 
place. However, plaintiff has not alleged any particulars as to why Massey’s stated reliance on 
those forecasts was false or misleading.”); Blanchard v. Katz, 705 F. Supp. 1011, 1012 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“These paragraphs do not suffice to remedy the lack of factual allegations 
underlying the claims of misrepresentations and material omissions of the first complaint. . . . 
Plaintiffs in the case at hand have only made conclusory allegations.”); Schwartz v. Novo In-
dustri, A/S, 658 F. Supp. 795, 799 (S.D.N.Y 1987) (“To satisfy the particularity requirement 
of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), a complaint must allege ‘(1) specific facts; (2) sources that support the 
alleged specific facts; and (3) a basis from which an inference of fraud may fairly be drawn.’ 
While plaintiff asserts that Novo knew or should have known of the above-mentioned circum-
stances, plaintiff, other than these bare categorical allegations, offers no sources for the knowl-
edge it seeks to impute to defendant.”) (quoting Crystal v. Foy, 562 F. Supp. 422, 425 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
 119. Some pre-PSLRA courts may have been reluctant to require a high degree of plead-
ing particularity in cases involving forward-looking statements because Rule 9(b) provides that 
“[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred gener-
ally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The PSLRA pleading standards, however, do not make an excep-
tion to the particularity requirements for the state of mind pleading, but rather specifically pro-
vide that the where a “required state of mind” is an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action, 
the complaint “shall . . . state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. I 1995); see 
supra note 22. 
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sarily underinclusive because they “designate[] a single fact . . . as 
always determinative of [the] inherently fact-specific finding . . . [of] 
materiality.”120 Although such tests are inconsistent with the materi-
ality standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in Basic, some lower 
courts have justified their use on the assumption that accuracy-based 
protection from liability for predictive statements is unavailable be-
cause such statements “will almost always prove to be wrong in hind-
sight.”121 By applying the implied representation doctrine, however, 
a court can provide significant accuracy-based protection for for-
ward-looking statements even if they have proven wrong. Moreover, 
the Reform Act’s heightened pleading requirements clearly empower 
courts to vigorously apply the implied representation doctrine at the 
pleading stage of a case involving forward-looking statements. Post-
PSLRA courts, therefore, should use the materiality standard en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court in Basic, rather than the lower court 
bright-line materiality tests, to give content the Reform Act’s “im-
materiality” safe harbor. 
These bright-line materiality tests may gradually whither and fi-
nally die on the vine because of their non-conformity to the holding 
in Basic and the absence of a justification for their use under the leg-
islative scheme of the PSLRA. However, the Helwig dissent’s dogged 
attachment to the substantial certainty test (as well as the Helwig ma-
jority’s qualified acceptance of that test) suggests that such tests may 
have some measure of staying power. Thus, while the abrogation of 
the bright-line tests may not be sufficiently critical by itself to war-
rant Supreme Court review of a case where the issue is raised, when 
the Supreme Court does decide to enter the thicket of PSLRA safe 
harbor interpretation, it would do well to explicitly extend its hold-




 120. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988). 
 121. Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993); see supra text accom-
panying note 96. 
